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Legal Issues in Medicine
I NDEPENDENT E XTERNAL R EVIEW
OF H EALTH M AINTENANCE
O RGANIZATIONS ’ M EDICAL N ECESSITY D ECISIONS
WENDY K. MARINER, J.D., M.P.H.

S

TATES may have more freedom to regulate the
practices of managed-care organizations than
many observers previously believed. In the absence of congressional action on the federal Bipartisan
Patient Protection Act,1 the primary source of patientprotection legislation remains at the state level. Nevertheless, the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 19742 restricts state regulation
of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) that
serve private employee group health plans. On June
20, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, upheld an Illinois state law that
requires binding independent external review when an
HMO disagrees with the decision of a patient’s physician that a treatment is medically necessary.3 The Moran decision clarifies the states’ authority, and may
allow physicians a larger say in decisions about managed-care coverage.
STATE REGULATION AND ERISA

Forty-one states and the District of Columbia have
laws requiring independent external review of denials
of benefits by HMOs, although these laws vary in
what types of decisions they apply to, who conducts
the review, what rules the reviewers must use, and
whether reviewers’ decisions are binding (Table 1).
Their general purpose is to ensure that decisions about
an individual patient’s care are made on the basis of
sound medical judgment rather than financial or business considerations alone. The Illinois law applies in
very narrow circumstances. Section 4-10 of the Illinois
Health Maintenance Organization Act requires HMOs
licensed in Illinois to submit benefit denials to an independent physician reviewer (unaffiliated with the
HMO and jointly selected by the patient, the patient’s
physician, and the HMO) “in the event of a dispute
between the primary care physician and the [HMO]
regarding the medical necessity of a covered service
proposed by a primary care physician.”4 If the independent reviewer decides that the treatment is medically necessary — and if it is a covered service under
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the HMO contract — the HMO is required to provide the covered service.4
Laws such as this one are typically part of a state’s
statutes licensing health insurance companies, HMOs,
preferred-provider organizations, and Blue Cross and
Blue Shield.5 States — not the federal government
— have historically regulated insurance.6 State regulation failed to protect employees from the loss of pensions, however, so Congress enacted ERISA in 1974
to set national standards for employers who voluntarily
offered pension plans to their employees.7,8 To achieve
national uniformity, Section 514 of ERISA supersedes
(“preempts”) any state law that “relates” to an ERISA
plan.9,10 (An ERISA plan is any plan created by a private employer, group of employers, or union, with a
few exceptions, to offer pensions, health coverage, or
other benefits to employees.11) More than 125 million
Americans obtain health care financed by ERISA
plans.12,13 The preemption by ERISA limits the application of state licensing statutes and other laws in
complicated ways, making it hard to predict whether
certain laws protect all the patients in a state.14,15
MORAN’S DISPUTE WITH RUSH
PRUDENTIAL

Deborah Moran was a member of Rush Prudential HMO, an HMO licensed under the Illinois act.
Her husband’s employer sponsored a fully insured
ERISA plan that provided memberships in this HMO
for employees and their dependents. Moran saw Dr.
Arthur LaMarre, her Rush network primary care physician, for pain, numbness, and loss of mobility in her
right shoulder in 1996. Conservative measures, such
as physiotherapy, that were recommended by Dr.
LaMarre did not relieve these symptoms. On her own,
Moran saw Dr. Julia Terzis, an out-of-network surgeon in Virginia, who diagnosed brachial plexopathy
and the thoracic outlet syndrome, a nerve-compression syndrome, and recommended decompression by
removal of the uppermost rib, extensive scalenectomy,
and microneurolysis (removal of scar tissue around the
injured nerves) of the brachial plexus under microscopical magnification.
Moran asked LaMarre to obtain Rush’s approval
for Terzis to perform this surgery. Two Rush-affiliated surgeons confirmed the diagnosis of the thoracic outlet syndrome but recommended standard surgery, with less extensive scalenectomy and neurolysis
and no microneurolysis. Moran believed Terzis’s approach offered a better prognosis, and LaMarre told
Rush that Moran would be “best served” by Terzis’s
surgery. Rush denied approval because Terzis was not
a Rush network physician. Moran appealed, and Rush
again denied approval, after consulting the literature
and its two surgeons, who confirmed that microneurolysis was not necessary. Instead, Rush approved
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TABLE 1. STATES

WITH

LAWS REQUIRING INDEPENDENT EXTERNAL REVIEW.
DECISIONS
MEDICAL

ABOUT

STATE

OR

DISTRICT

INDEPENDENT
REVIEW
REQUIRED

Alaska
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Total

42

ALL
DECISIONS*

DECISIONS ABOUT NECESSITY AND
MEDICAL
EXPERIMENTAL
NECESSITY†
TREATMENT‡

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

BINDING
REVIEW§

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

12

34

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

11

19

*The state law applies to all coverage decisions made by the health maintenance organization.
†The state law applies only to determinations about medical necessity.
‡The state law applies only to determinations about medical necessity or the experimental nature
of treatment.
§The decision resulting from the independent external review is binding on the health maintenance
organization.
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standard surgery for the thoracic outlet syndrome,
to be performed by a Rush network surgeon.
Moran demanded that Rush submit the dispute
for independent external review under section 4-10
of the Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Act,
but Rush did not do so. The next month, Moran
underwent surgery performed by Terzis, paying the
$94,841.27 charge herself. She then claimed reimbursement from Rush, which denied the claim after
conducting another review with additional physicians.
Finally, Moran filed suit in Illinois state court and
won a judgment forcing Rush to submit to independent review. An independent physician reviewer found
that the surgery, including microneurolysis, was medically necessary. Moran then asked the state court to
require Rush to reimburse her for the cost of the surgery. Rush moved the case to federal court, claiming
that it did not have to comply with the independent
review because ERISA preempted section 4-10 of
the Illinois act.16
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

The Supreme Court did not decide whether Moran’s preferred treatment was in fact medically necessary — a question on which reasonable people
might disagree. The question before the Court was
whether Rush had to comply with the Illinois law and
submit to independent review. The Court held that it
did, in a five-to-four opinion written by Justice David
Souter, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra
Day O’Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen
Breyer.3
The Court’s decision turned on a technical analysis of ERISA preemption. ERISA does not preempt
state laws that regulate insurance. However, state laws
that relate to ERISA plans, as the Illinois law did in this
case, can be enforced only if they qualify as regulating
the “business of insurance,” which is a term of art.17,18
It does not include everything an insurance company
happens to do but, rather, is limited to traditional insurance practices such as accepting and spreading financial risk, underwriting, and making decisions about
coverage.19-21 The Court has used two tests to determine whether a law regulates insurance. First, under
the so-called common-sense test, the law must be directed specifically at the insurance industry and not
commerce or contracts in general.20 Rush argued that
HMOs are not engaged in the business of insurance
because they provide medical care. The Court rejected that argument, finding that HMOs also provide insurance by accepting fixed premiums and taking on
the financial risk of providing care. Thus, state laws
that regulate insurance functions can be applied to
HMOs, as to other insurers.
Under the second test, the state law must target
one of three key characteristics of insurance: the transfer or spread of a policyholder’s risk, the policy rela-

tionship between the insured and the insurer, or
practices limited to the insurance industry specifically.18,20,22,23 The Court found that section 4-10 of the
Illinois HMO Act affects the second — the policy
relationship between Moran, the insured, and Rush,
the insurer — by adding a mandated term to the
policy. Moreover, the independent review required
by the Illinois law entailed interpreting the insurance
policy, which the Court said was “at the ‘core’ of the
business of insurance.”3 The Illinois law also targeted
the third characteristic, since HMO policies are insurance policies. Therefore, the Illinois law qualified as insurance regulation and was not preempted by ERISA,
so Rush was required to comply with independent external review.
Rush then argued that even if the Illinois law was
not preempted by ERISA because it regulates insurance, it conflicted with another ERISA provision and
should not be enforced. ERISA section 502(a) grants
plan participants the right to sue the ERISA plan to
enforce their rights under the plan or to recover the
dollar amount of any wrongfully denied plan benefit
(i.e., the cost of a medical or diagnostic procedure, but
not compensation for personal injuries, such as lost
wages or additional medical expenses).24,25 Earlier
Supreme Court decisions held that participants in an
ERISA plan cannot use state law to obtain a remedy
for denied benefits that section 502(a) does not provide, such as punitive damages.26-29 Rush interpreted
these decisions to mean that the states could not require HMOs to use any other method of resolving
disputes with participants in an ERISA plan, including
state-mandated independent review or arbitration.
Uncertainty about whether ERISA forbids any dispute-resolution methods except a lawsuit under section 502(a) has bedeviled the states,14,30-32 prompted
federal regulations regarding new internal-review procedures,33 and encouraged the pending federal legislation that would require independent review for all
ERISA plans.1
The majority of the Court rejected Rush’s argument, resolving much of the uncertainty. The Court
ruled that section 502(a) does not address preemption
at all. The fact that section 502(a) provides a remedy
for denied benefits does not mean that ERISA automatically preempts a state law. The Court also noted
that the Illinois law did not actually give ERISA plan
participants an additional remedy. It merely required
the HMO to use an additional level of appeal before
finally denying benefits. If an HMO refused to submit to independent review, a patient like Moran could
bring a lawsuit under section 502(a) to force compliance with independent review. If an HMO refused to
pay covered benefits, the patient would still have to
bring a lawsuit under ERISA section 502(a) — not
state law — to collect payment. Thus, the law was consistent with ERISA and applied to Rush.
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION

The Moran decision opens the door to more extensive state regulation of HMOs. There is no doubt
that states are free to regulate the quality of medical
care and medical practice, because medical care itself
does not relate to ERISA plans.34-37 ERISA plan participants may sue physicians for malpractice because
medical judgment is not related to ERISA plans.38-40
What the Moran decision clarified is that states are
also free to regulate insurance as a way to regulate the
practice of medicine and protect the quality of care.
This might include imposing professional standards
for the quality of care offered by HMOs or requiring
coverage of medically necessary care as a mandated
benefit. These requirements should increase the role
of physicians in determining the quality of care that
must be provided as part of an HMO policy.
The decision indicates that the majority of state
laws requiring independent review of benefit denials
can be enforced against HMOs. Although Illinois’s
law was narrow — applying only to disputes over
medical necessity between an HMO and a physician
— the Court’s reasoning appears applicable to broader state laws. My analysis of state laws reveals that 19
states, including Illinois, currently limit the requirement of independent external review to disputes about
medical necessity (Table 1). An additional 12 states
require independent review only for disputes about
medical necessity and about whether a treatment is
experimental. All these state laws should be enforceable against HMOs.
Ten states and the District of Columbia have independent-review laws that appear also to apply to
disputes over the interpretation of the scope of coverage or an insurance contract (Table 1). In 2000, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a Texas
law requiring independent external review in cases of
disputes over benefit coverage, concluding that it
provided an alternative remedy that conflicted with
ERISA section 502(a).41 In Moran, the Supreme
Court rejected the same argument by Rush. Four
days later, it unanimously vacated the Fifth Circuit
Court’s decision and sent it back for further consideration in the light of the ruling in Moran.42 Thus,
further proceedings may determine whether decisions about coverage that do not depend on medical
judgment about medical necessity may be subject to
independent review under state law.
Nine states have no law requiring independent external review of HMO benefit denials. The Moran decision may encourage these states to adopt such laws.
Surveys show that the public favors independent review of benefit decisions.43 The Court appeared to
agree, by drawing an analogy between independent
review of decisions about medical necessity and the
practice of getting another physician’s medical opinion. It also hinted that state law might forbid HMOs

from writing contracts that reserve for the HMO the
sole authority to make decisions about medical necessity.
The Supreme Court has now made clear that state
independent-review laws can apply to HMOs that sell
their own policies to fully insured ERISA plans. (Fully
insured ERISA plans provide health benefits to employees by buying a group health insurance policy
from an insurance company or HMO; employees receive whatever benefits the HMO’s policy covers.)
The question is whether such laws may also apply to
HMOs that merely administer self-funded ERISA
plans. The Court did not have to decide this question,
because Moran’s ERISA plan was fully insured.
An estimated 40 percent of all participants in ERISA
plans are in self-funded plans.12 Self-funded (or “selfinsured”) ERISA plans do not buy insurance policies
from an HMO. Instead, the ERISA plan itself pays for
health care services directly out of plan assets (i.e., employer and employee contributions). Most self-funded
ERISA plans hire an HMO, for a fixed fee, to administer the health benefits under the plan and to make
decisions about coverage, because the employer has
no particular expertise to do so.44
The Court’s reasoning suggests that states could
require all HMOs that make coverage decisions to provide independent external review as a condition of licensure, at least when the decision involves questions
of medical judgment. The Court found that making
benefit decisions is a core insurance function and that
laws regulating how such decisions are made qualify as
insurance regulation and are therefore not preempted by ERISA. It also noted that there was “nothing
standing in the way” of applying this insurance exception from preemption by ERISA to HMOs that
provide only administrative services to a self-funded
ERISA plan.3 Therefore, states should be able to require HMOs that make final decisions about coverage for ERISA plans to use independent external review (although they could not require ERISA plans
themselves to do so).
This interpretation may depend on whether the
HMO has the ultimate authority to make final judgments about medical necessity and benefit coverage.
Some self-funded ERISA plans give HMOs the discretion to make final, binding decisions about benefits,
but others do not. If the ERISA plan does not grant
the HMO the discretion to make final decisions, then
the HMO’s administrative functions might not qualify
as the “business of insurance” and therefore would not
be subject to state laws regulating insurance. If this interpretation is correct, an HMO could avoid compliance with independent-review laws by refusing to
accept ultimate decision-making authority on behalf of
a self-funded ERISA plan. Alternatively, a self-funded
ERISA plan could retain the right to approve any
decision made by an HMO, so that the HMO would
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not have to comply with a requirement for independent review. In effect, the terms of the administrativeservices contract between the ERISA plan and the
HMO could determine whether or not a state insurance law applied to the HMO. The contract terms
might not change how coverage decisions are made in
practice, but they would be likely to control whether
patients in self-funded ERISA plans are entitled to
independent review. This elevates form over substance,
but it is an inevitable product of the split federal–state
jurisdiction over insurance that ERISA created in the
first place.
CONCLUSIONS

The Moran decision is consistent with ERISA’s
original design, which kept the business of insurance
under state jurisdiction and placed ERISA plans themselves under federal law even though they use insurance to provide employee benefits. In Moran, the Supreme Court makes clear that it is no longer prudent
to assume that HMOs are exempt from state insurance regulation merely because they serve ERISA
plans. In particular, HMOs that serve fully insured
ERISA plans must comply with state laws requiring
independent review of determinations of medical necessity. HMOs that administer self-funded ERISA
plans may also have to comply if they make binding
decisions about coverage. However, deciding what
counts as insurance regulation that is enforceable
against HMOs that serve ERISA plans remains a
highly technical exercise.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Moran may encourage increased state regulation of HMOs and reduce
pressure on Congress to enact federal legislation providing national standards for independent external review, liability, and other aspects of managed care. This
raises the policy question of whether managed-care
practices are best regulated at the state or federal level.
Only federal legislation can require nationally uniform
rules for all patients and physicians.

I am indebted to Carrie Buchanan for research assistance in cataloguing and analyzing state laws regarding independent external
review.
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